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Tyson v. L'eggs Products, Inc.: The North Carolina Court of
Appeals Provides a Solution to the Business Name Game
Whom do you sue? Trying to determine the proper party to sue in an age
of diversified business conglomerates and proliferating subsidiaries can be an ex-
ercise in legal futility not only for a naive plaintiff but also for the unwary attor-
ney. No effective judicial system can permit businesses to escape responsibility
for their misdeeds by masking their legal identities with corporate red tape.
Consequently, North Carolina courts have long recognized their role in provid-
ing protection for consumers and other parties when businesses have sought to
conduct commercial activities in a potentially deceptive or fraudulent manner,
such as by failing to register an assumed business name.'
Yet prospective defendants have a legitimate interest in avoiding misdi-
rected lawsuits, and the courts have an equally compelling interest in assuring
accuracy in the designation of defendants.2 Because the summons plays an es-
sential role in alerting a defendant that he must appear in court to answer a
complaint filed against him,3 errors made in naming the proper defendant or in
delivering the summons can leave the intended defendant without notice of an
impending lawsuit and confuse all parties concerned. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals attempted to resolve some of this confusion in Tyson v. L'eggs Prod-
ucts, Inc.,4 in which the misdelivery of a summons to the registered agent for a
similarly named corporate defendant was further complicated by the intended
defendant's failure to comply promptly with the North Carolina assumed busi-
ness name registration statute.
This Note examines the court of appeals' holding in Tyson that a plaintiff
may properly sue a corporation in its assumed business name in addition to its
official corporate designation.5 This Note also explores several aspects of the
Tyson opinion that may have significant implications for future cases. First, the
1. See Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493, 101 S.E. 33 (1919); Courtney v. Parker, 173 N.C. 479,
92 S.E. 324 (1917).
2. "'A suit at law is not a children's game, but a serious effort on the part of adult human
beings to administer justice; and the purpose of process is to bring parties into court.'" Wiles v.
Welparnel Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 84, 243 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978) (quoting United States v. A.H.
Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947)); see also B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer,
268 N.C. 1, 10, 149 S.E.2d 570, 577 (1966) (" 'Due process of law' requires that a defendant shall be
properly notified of the proceeding against him .... ").
3. "'The purpose and aim of the service of the summons are to give notice to the party against
whom the proceeding or action is commenced, and any notification which reasonably accomplishes
that purpose answers the claims of law and justice.'" Farr v. City of Rocky Mount, 10 N.C. App.
128, 130, 177 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1970) (quoting Jester v. Steam Packet Co., 131 N.C. 54, 55, 42 S.E.
447, 447 (1902)), cert denied, 277 N.C. 725, 178 S.E.2d 831 (1971). "Unless notice is given to the
defendant of proceedings against him and he is thereby given the opportunity to appear and be heard
or he appears voluntarily, the court has no jurisdiction to proceed to judgment even though it may
have subject matter jurisdiction." Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 542, 319 S.E.2d 912, 916
(1984), aff'd on remand, 84 N.C. App. 607, 353 S.E.2d 656, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 168, 358
S.E.2d 50 (1987); see also Beaufort County v. Mayo, 207 N.C. 211, 214, 176 S.E. 753, 755 (1934).
4. 84 N.C. App. 1, 351 S.E.2d 834 (1987).
5. Procedures for registering an assumed business name and penalties for failing to register a
name as required by law are outlined in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-68 to -71 (1985).
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Note details the circumstances resulting in the initial misdirection of plaintiffs'
summons naming "L'eggs Products, Inc." as corporate defendant to the regis-
tered agent for "Leggs, Inc.," a completely different North Carolina corpora-
tion. The Note then examines the subsequent use of an alias and pluries
summons to validate service of process on "L'eggs Products, Inc." after the expi-
ration of the statute of limitations. Third, the Note examines North Carolina's
assumed business name registration statute and compares the court of appeals'
treatment of the filing of a suit in an assumed business name with other jurisdic-
tions' treatment of the same issue. Fourth, the Note discusses the consumer
protection justification for permitting plaintiffs to sue businesses in their as-
sumed business names. The Note concludes that although the court of appeals'
decision in Tyson may prevent businesses from shielding themselves from poten-
tial liability by hiding behind a maze of incomprehensible business designations
and intracorporate distinctions, it creates possibilities for abuse and threatens
the principle of repose on which the statute of limitations is based. This Note
then suggests measures that should be taken to preclude plaintiffs from abusing
their newfound freedom and to overcome the notice problem the case brings to
light.
On May 2, 1984, the Richmond County Daily Journal published a letter to
the editor written by plaintiff-appellants Virginia Tyson and Rose Bennett. This
letter questioned the accuracy of an article released to the press by their em-
ployer, L'eggs Products, Inc., stating that symptoms of tendonitis experienced
by some plant employees were not work-related. 6 Plaintiffs' letter alleged that
many employees did not report symptoms of tendonitis for fear that they would
be dismissed or intimidated by management and because company medical per-
sonnel did not take such complaints seriously. 7 In response to plaintiffs' letter,
employees at the Richmond County L'eggs plant circulated and later mailed to
the Richmond County Daily Journal and WSOC-TV in Charlotte a letter deny-
ing the allegations expressed in plaintiffs' letter and criticizing fellow employees
who "want the money but don't want to work for it."8 Plaintiffs alleged that
this letter was defamatory and initiated a proceeding in Richmond County Supe-
rior Court naming as defendants their employer L'eggs Products, Inc. and four-
teen of the forty-seven fellow employees who signed the letter.
Sara Lee Corporation (Sara Lee), the parent corporation of L'eggs Prod-
ucts, made a special appearance 9 and moved to dismiss the suit against the cor-
porate defendant under Rule 12(b) for lack of jurisdiction, insufficiency of
6. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 9, 351 S.E.2d at 839; Record at 17, Tyson (No. 8620SC268) (reprint
of letter).
7. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 9, 351 S.E.2d at 839.
8. Id. at 9-10, 351 S.E.2d at 839; Record at 8-9 (reprint of letter).
9. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 3, 351 S.E.2d at 835. Defendants may make a special appearance to
contest personal jurisdiction by objecting to lack of service of process or to a defect in the process or
its service. In re Blalock, 233 N.C. 493, 503, 64 S.E.2d 848, 855 (1951). Challenges to personal
jurisdiction may also be asserted either in motions or responsive pleadings, largely eliminating the
necessity for the special appearance. See Simms v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 285 N.C. 145, 153, 203
S.E.2d 769, 774 (1974); N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
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process, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 10 In
particular, Sara Lee alleged that L'eggs Products was not a legal entity capable
of being sued in North Carolina. 1 The individual defendants also moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and upon consideration of these motions the
trial judge found that all defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 12
Although the appeal by Tyson and Bennett focused both on the sufficiency
of process and the substantive merits of their libel charge, 13 this Note addresses
only the court of appeals' treatment of the dismissal of the corporate defendant
in the trial court for plaintiffs' failure to name as defendant a legal entity capable
of being sued in this state. The facts before the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals pertaining to the issue of defendant's ability to be sued showed that on July
27, 1981, Consolidated Foods Corporation, a Maryland corporation, registered
its use of the assumed business name "L'eggs Products, Inc." with the Register
of Deeds of Richmond County pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes
section 66-68.14 Consolidated Foods changed its name to Sara Lee Corporation
(Sara Lee) on April 2, 1985, retaining the assumed name "L'eggs Products,
Inc." for that division of its operations and executing an amendment to assumed
name registration on April 3, 1985.15 Importantly, however, Sara Lee did not
file this amendment with the Register of Deeds of Richmond County until three
months later on July 15, 1985.16
In the meantime, plaintiffs Tyson and Bennett filed their complaint and a
summons was issued on June 6, 1985, before Sara Lee's amended assumed name
registration appeared on the Richmond County records. 17 Plaintiffs named as
10. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 2-3, 351 S.E.2d at 835; see N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
11. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 3, 351 S.E.2d at 835.
12. Id.
13. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
14. North Carolina General Statutes section 66-68 reads in pertinent part:
(a) [Blefore any person or partnership other than a limited partnership engages in busi-
ness in any county in this State under an assumed name or under any designation, name, or
style other than the real name of the owner or owners thereof, or before a corporation
engages in business in any county other than under its corporate name, such person, part-
nership, or corporation must file in the office of the register of deeds of such county a
certificate giving the following information:
(1) The name under which the business is to be conducted;
(2) The name and address of the owner, or if there is more than one owner, the name
and address of each.
(b) If the owner is a corporation, it must be signed in the name of the corporation and
duly acknowledged ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-68 (1988).
Section 66-71 provides that failure to file a certificate of assumed name is a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a fine of not more than fifty dollars or imprisonment for not more than thirty days. In
addition, section 66-71 states that any person, partnership, or corporation failing to file as required
shall be liable for fifty dollars to any person demanding that a certificate of assumed name be filed if
no filing is made within seven days after such demand. Id. § 66-71(a)(2) (1985). Finally, the statute
provides that failure to comply with its provisions does not prevent the violator from recovering
damages in any civil actions brought in North Carolina courts. Id. § 66-71(b).
15. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 3, 351 S.E.2d at 835.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3, 351 S.E.2d at 836. According to plaintiffs, the alleged defamatory letter was pub-
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corporate defendant "L'eggs Products, Inc." and directed the summons to
"L'eggs Products, Inc. c/o Registered Agent Proctor-Wayne Leggett, Route 2,
Box 340, Fairmont, North Carolina 28340."'1 Proctor-Wayne Leggett, how-
ever, was not the registered agent for Consolidated Foods/Sara Lee, but was
instead an agent for "Leggs, Inc.," a completely unrelated for-profit North Car-
olina corporation located in Fairmont, North Carolina. 19 Plaintiffs' complaint
incorrectly stated that defendant L'eggs Products, Inc. was a for-profit North
Carolina corporation, but correctly added that L'eggs Products had its principal
place of business in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and a plant in Richmond
County, North Carolina.20
On July 5, 1985, Sara Lee made its special appearance to move for dismissal
of all plaintiffs' charges as to the corporate defendant. 21 Ten days later, on July
15, Sara Lee filed the Amendment to Assumed Name Registration in Richmond
County.2 2 On August 14, 1985, plaintiffs directed an alias and pluries sum-
mons23 to be served on "L'eggs Products, Inc., c/o Bill Flinchum, Post Office
Box 2495, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27102."24 As Sara Lee's Vice- Presi-
dent of Manufacturing in its L'eggs Products Division, Flinchum was author-
ized to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation.25 Sara Lee later
renewed its motion to dismiss the corporate defendant under Rules 12(b)(2), (4),
(5), and (6), and the trial court granted this motion.26 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Becton, held that the trial
court erroneously granted corporate defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.27 The court concluded, however, that the letter circulated
lished on June 5 and 6, 1984. The statute of limitations on a libel action in North Carolina is one
year from the date of publication of the alleged defamatory material. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(3)
(1983). See Pressley v. Continental Can Co., 39 N.C. App. 467, 468, 250 S.E.2d 676, 677, disc rev.
denied, 297 N.C. 177, 254 S.E.2d 37 (1979); Price v. J.C. Penney Co., 26 N.C. App. 249, 252, 216
S.E.2d 154, 156, cerL denied, 288 N.C. 243, 217 S.E.2d 666 (1975).
18. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 3, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
19. Id. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836. The registered agent in North Carolina for Sara Lee was C.T.
Corporation System of Durham, North Carolina.
20. Id. Sara Lee was in fact incorporated under the corporation laws of the state of Maryland.
Id. at 3, 351 S.E.2d at 835.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
22. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
23. North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) provides that a plaintiff may continue an
action in the event defendant is not served within the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 4(c) by suing
out an alias and pluries summons within 90 days of the date of issue of the last preceding summons.
"The function of an alias and pluries summons is to keep a lawsuit alive and maintain the original
date of the commencement of the action when the original summons has not been properly served
upon the original defendant named therein." Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 837; see infra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
24. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
25. North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(6) provides that service of process upon a
domestic corporation may be accomplished "[b]y delivering a copy of the summons and of the com-
plaint to an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation." N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(6); see
Simms v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 285 N.C. 145, 149, 203 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1974).
26. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836; see N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
27. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 8, 351 S.E.2d at 838. Conclusions of law drawn by the trial judge,
such as a finding of lack of personal jurisdiction, are reviewable de novo on appeal. See Hofier v.
Hill, 311 N.C. 325, 329, 317 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984); Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C.
186, 187, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980).
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by the individual defendants was not defamatory as a matter of law, and thus
dismissed the suit against the individual defendants and also L'eggs Products
because any liability on the part of the latter would be entirely derivative."8
In the court of appeals defendant L'eggs Products offered two arguments in
support of the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. Citing plaintiffs' in-
correct reference to L'eggs Products, Inc. as a North Carolina corporation and
the initial direction of process to the registered agent for "Leggs, Inc.," L'eggs
Products first contended that the dismissal was proper because plaintiffs failed to
sue "L'eggs Products, Inc." at all and instead brought suit against the Fairmont,
North Carolina corporation "Leggs, Inc."'29 The court of appeals rejected this
argument, however, relying on precedent to draw a distinction between plain-
tiffs' designation of the improper agent for service of process and the improper
designation of the corporate defendant.30
The court compared Tyson to the 1978 North Carolina Supreme Court de-
cision Wiles v. Welparnel Construction Co.3 1 In Wiles the court held that a sum-
mons directed to an agent or officer of a corporation is not invalid if the
corporation's name is stated in the caption of the summons and in the complaint
so that it is clear that the corporation itself and not any agent or officer of the
corporation is the intended defendant. 32 The holding in Wiles was sensible be-
cause it eliminated the largely technical distinction between directing a sum-
mons to a corporate representative or agent and directing it to the corporate
28. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 8-14, 351 S.E.2d at 838-42. Any liability of L'eggs Products would
be derivative because plaintiffs alleged the individual defendants acted as agents of the corporate
defendant by circulating the letter in question at the Leggs plant with the permission of plant super-
visors. Id. at 8, 351 S.E.2d at 838. The court concluded the contents of the letter were not libel per
se because when stripped of any insinuations or explanatory circumstances they merely amounted to
"a hearty declaration of disagreement with the plaintiffs' views and an explicit expression of anger
toward an unnamed 'handful of employees."' Id. at 12, 351 S.E.2d at 840-41. The contents were
not libel per quod because they were not capable of conferring a defamatory meaning when combined
with any innuendo, and were more properly characterized as a "robust" response to plaintiffs' letter
published as part of an ongoing public controversy. Id. at 13-14, 351 S.E.2d at 841-42. Judge
Martin concurred, and Judge Phillips concurred in the result.
29. Id. at 4-5, 351 S.E.2d at 836. L'eggs Products asserted that even if the subsequent alias and
pluries summons correctly designated the intended defendant, the one-year statute of limitations for
libel actions had run by the time this second summons issued. Id. The corporate defendant added
that since L'eggs Products was not a party to the first summons, the alias and pluries summons
would be inoperative to keep plaintiffs' action alive after the statute of limitations had run. Id.; see
infra notes 42-48, 89-96 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 836-37.
31. 295 N.C. 81, 243 S.E.2d 756 (1978).
32. Id. at 85, 243 S.E.2d at 758. The defendant in an action and the person to whom process is
directed will often be two different legal entities. In Wiles the plaintiffs had directed a summons to
Mr. T.T. Nelson, registered agent for the Welparnel Construction Company, in order to put
Welparnel on notice of plaintiffs' lawsuit. Id. at 82, 243 S.E.2d at 756-57. Defendant objected under
the long-standing rule that service directed to and served on an agent or officer of a corporation
constituted effective service as to that individual only and not to the corporation. Id. at 83, 243
S.E.2d at 757 (citing Russell v. Bea Staple Mfg. Co., 266 N.C. 531, 534, 146 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1966);
Hassell & Co. v. Daniels' Roanoke River Line Steamboat Co., 168 N.C. 296, 297, 84 S.E. 363, 364
(1915)). The Wiles court overruled these cases, however, holding that no substantial misunderstand-
ing as to the identity of the party being sued is likely to result where a summons clearly naming a
corporation as defendant is served upon a designated corporate representative. Wiles, 295 N.C. at
85, 243 S.E.2d at 758-59; see Wearring v. Belk Bros., 38 N.C. App. 375, 377, 248 S.E.2d 90, 91
(1978); Gro-Mar Public Relations, Inc. v. Billy Jack Enters., Inc., 36 N.C. App. 673, 676, 245 S.E.2d
782, 784 (1978).
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defendant itself.33 Significantly, Judge Becton's statement of the Wiles holding
in Tyson omitted one key phrase that prevented a precise correlation between the
issues in the two cases--"when properly served."' 34 Justice Copeland's complete
statement of the holding in Wiles was:
[T]he better rule in cases such as this is that when the name of the
defendant is sufficiently stated in the caption of the summons and in
the complaint, such that it is clear that the corporation, rather than the
officer or agent receiving service, is the entity being sued, the sum-
mons, when properly served upon an officer, director, or agent specified
in N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(6), is adequate to bring the corporate defendant
within the trial court's jurisdiction.35
The problem in Tyson did not arise because service of process was directed
to a registered agent of L'eggs Products, Inc. when L'eggs Products, Inc. itself
was the defendant plaintiffs intended to sue, but because process was improperly
served upon the registered agent for Leggs, Inc., a corporation completely unre-
lated to L'eggs Products, Inc. and an entirely different legal entity. Sara Lee
contended, therefore, that plaintiffs intended to sue Leggs, Inc.36 and could not
thereafter amend their summons to name the correct defendant because this
amendment would amount to a substitution of parties after the running of the
statute of limitations.37 Because L'eggs Products received no notice of the pro-
ceedings instituted by plaintiffs before the expiration of the one-year statute of
limitations for a libel cause of action, L'eggs Products' argument initially ap-
33. One commentator has attributed the confusion in the area of service of process to the sum-
mons forms on which plaintiffs must indicate to whom they wish to direct process. See Note, North
Carolina Rule 4(b) and Service of Process on a Corporate Defendant, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 105
(1979). Currently, the party to whom process is "directed" is the party to whom the sheriff delivers
the summons. Id. at 106, n.9. The commentator concludes that a new form should be created for
corporate defendants so that plaintiffs can clearly distinguish between the party to whom process is
directed (defined by the commentator as the actual defendant in the action) and the party to whom
process is delivered (a registered agent, officer, or director in the case of a corporation), a distinction
that is difficult to indicate on the present forms. Id. at 106, 112. For more thorough treatment of
the meaning of the term "directed," see infra note 46.
34. See Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 836. Judge Becton states the holding in Wiles
as follows: "[A] summons directed to the registered agent of a corporation is not defective if the
captions of the summons and complaint clearly indicate that the corporation, and not the agent, is
the intended defendant." Id.
35. Wiles, 295 N.C. at 85, 243 S.E.2d at 758 (emphasis added).
36. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
37. It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot amend his summons or complaint after the statute of
limitations to substitute a new party as defendant who was not named a defendant in the original
summons and complaint and who received no notice of the action before the expiration of the statute
of limitations. See Crawford v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 44 N.C. App. 368, 371, 261 S.E.2d 25,
27 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 329, 265 S.E.2d 394 (1980); Teague v. Asheboro Motor Co., 14
N.C. App. 736, 739, 189 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1972); Hogsed v. Pearlman, 213 N.C. 240, 242, 195 S.E.
789, 790 (1938). But cf Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 297, 293 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1982) (court
should normally allow amendment of process to correct the name of a party already in court); Wear-
ring v. Belk Bros., 38 N.C. App. 375, 376, 248 S.E.2d 90, 90 (1978) (requirement of particularity in
naming defendant in summons "does not force courts to overlook the obvious"); Bailey v. McPher-
son, 233 N.C. 231, 235, 63 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1951) (amendment to process or pleading allowed in
court's discretion to correct a misnomer or mistake in the name of a party if the error does not leave
in doubt the identity of the party intended to be sued).
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peared persuasive. 3
The supreme court did emphasize in Wiles, however, that the person to
whom a summons is directed is subordinate to the party named in the caption of
the summons if it is clear that plaintiff intended the party named in the caption
to be the defendant. 39 When the court of appeals applied this rule to the facts in
Tyson, it concluded that plaintiffs intended L'eggs Products, Inc., not Leggs,
Inc., to be the defendant. Plaintiffs both named L'eggs Products, Inc. as the
intended defendant in the caption of the summons and directed the summons to
L'eggs Products, Inc., in care of Registered Agent Proctor-Wayne Leggett.40 It
follows that any defect in the sufficiency of the process in Tyson resulted not
from plaintiffs' ambiguity in identifying the corporate defendant they intended
to sue, but from the initial service of process on an officer of defendant Sara Lee
Corporation only after the statute of limitations for plaintiffs' cause of action
had run and Sara Lee's failure to receive notice of the action before this
expiration.
Having established that plaintiffs' summons and complaint named L'eggs
Products, Inc. as defendant, the court held that plaintiffs' use of an alias and
pluries summons cured the apparent statute of limitations problem.4 1 The ra-
tionale behind this holding deserves more explanation than the court provides.
According to the Tyson court, the purpose of an alias and pluries summons is
"to keep a lawsuit alive and maintain the original date of the commencement of
the action when the original summons has not been properly served upon the
original defendant named therein.",42 The court of appeals previously had elabo-
rated on this general rule: "Alias, pluries and endorsed summons are good for
later service within an extended time frame to prevent the statute of limitations
from running only as against parties who are actually and correctly denomi-
nated as parties in the original process." 4 3 Therefore, because plaintiffs cor-
rectly named L'eggs Products as a defendant in the original summons and
38. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the notice issues raised by
the use of an alias and pluries summons.
39. Wiles, 295 N.C. at 85, 243 S.E.2d at 758. Factors to be considered in determining the
intended defendant include the name of the defendant listed by plaintiff in the captions of the com-
plaint and summons and whether a summons is addressed directly to an agent or instead to a corpo-
rate defendant in care of the agent. In a case such as Tyson where a corporate defendant is correctly
named in the complaint and summons, and process is directed to the corporate defendant in care of
an agent, it is clear that the corporate defendant is the party the plaintiff intends to sue. See Tyson,
84 N.C. App. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
40. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 836. Registered Agent Proctor-Wayne Leggett was
admittedly authorized to receive service of process only for Leggs, Inc., not L'eggs Products, Inc..
Plaintiffs' correct references to L'eggs Products' Winston-Salem and Richmond County facilities
further demonstrated that "L'eggs Products, Inc." and not "Leggs, Inc." was the intended defend-
ant. The court of appeals found that the specificity of these two references should have eliminated
any confusion plaintiffs' incorrect designation of "L'eggs Products, Inc." as a North Carolina corpo-
ration created. Id. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 836-37.
41. Id. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 837.
42. Id (emphasis added). North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that "[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." N.C. R. CIv. P. 3. Because plaintiffs
filed their complaint in Richmond County Superior Court on June 6, 1985, a valid alias and pluries
summons would preserve this June 6 date after the expiration of the statute of limitations on June 7
or 8.
43. Harris v. Maready, 64 N.C. App. 1, 7, 306 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1983), rev'd on other grounds,
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complied with the requirements of Rule 4(d)(2) for issuance of an alias and
pluries summons, the statute of limitations was tolled until L'eggs Products
could be properly served with a summons through one of its officers or a regis-
tered agent.44
In the earlier case of Roshelli v. Sperry45 the court of appeals stated that the
purpose of Rule 4(d) is "to keep the action alive... by issuance of an alias or
pluries summons in situations where the original, properly directed summons
was not yet served."" This potential discrepancy from prior case law must be
read in light of both Rule 4(b) and the Wiles holding that process directed to a
registered agent of a corporation is sufficient to constitute service on the corpo-
ration itself if the caption of the summons clearly denominates the corporation
as the intended defendant.47 In any event, the statement quoted from Roshelli is
fully reconcilable with the holding in Tyson, since process in Tyson was directed
to the corporate defendant in care of an improper agent rather than specifically
to the Leggs, Inc. agent himself.48
L'eggs Products maintained in its second argument that plaintiffs could not
bring suit against L'eggs Products because it was only a division of the Sara Lee
Corporation and not a distinct legal entity capable of being sued.49 The facts
before the court showed that even if plaintiffs had consulted the assumed busi-
ness name registrations at the Richmond County Register of Deeds office before
filing suit, they would not have learned the true identity of L'eggs' parent corpo-
ration because of Sara Lee's failure to file an amendment to its assumed name
registration until July 15, 1985, well over a month after plaintiffs had filed their
complaint.50 Plaintiffs' check of the records would only have shown that L'eggs
Products was a division of Consolidated Foods, and plaintiffs would have then
311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984). The court uses "correctly denominated" to mean "correctly
named," not "properly directed."
44. See Long v. Fink, 80 N.C. App. 482, 485, 342 S.E.2d 557, 559 (1986) ("statute of limita-
tions is tolled when suit is properly instituted and it stays tolled as long as the action is alive"); see
also N.C. R. Civ. P. 4j)(6) (enumerating proper methods of service of process upon a domestic or
foreign corporation).
45. 63 N.C. App. 509, 305 S.E.2d 218, cert denied, 309 N.C. 633, 308 S.E.2d 716 (1983).
46. Id. at 511-12, 305 S.E.2d at 219 (emphasis added); see also N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (summons
shall be directed to defendant). Although North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) clearly estab-
lishes the defendant as the party to whom process "is directed," another interpretation of the term
"directed" seems to indicate that the party receiving service of process is the party to whom process
should be directed. See Note, supra note 33, at 106 n.9. Thus, Roshelli is in complete accord with
prior law if "properly directed" means that the defendant must be correctly designated. Roshelli is
anomalous, however, if "properly directed" is interpreted to mean "properly served," since the func-
tion of an alias and pluries summons is to prevent expiration of an action when the original summons
properly naming the intended defendant is improperly served or cannot be delivered to the party
intended to receive process. See Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 5, 351 S.E.2d at 837.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
48. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 4-5, 351 S.E.2d at 836. Applying the Roshelli requirement that the
original process must be properly directed to the facts in Tyson, plaintiffs' direction of the summons
to "L'eggs Products, Inc. c/o Registered Agent Proctor-Wayne Leggett" fully meets the Roshelli
test. Plaintiffs properly directed the summons to L'eggs Products, Inc., incorrectly designating only
the registered agent capable of receiving process on behalf of the corporation.
49. Id. at 6, 351 S.E.2d at 837.
50. Id. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836. Consolidated Foods had changed its name to Sara Lee Corpora-
tion on April 2, 1985, but it was over three months before this change was filed with the county's
register of deeds in compliance with North Carolina General Statutes § 66-68.
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named Consolidated Foods as the corporate defendant. But by June 6, 1985,
when plaintiffs instituted their action, Consolidated Foods no longer existed as a
legal entity in North Carolina, having been replaced by Sara Lee Corporation."1
L'eggs Products argued that this whole series of events engendered substan-
tial confusion over the intended corporate defendant in plaintiffs' suit. The
court properly noted, however, that a summons was eventually served on Sara
Lee's Vice President of Manufacturing in its L'eggs Products Division, "a corpo-
rate agent who might be expected to know that 'L'eggs Products' is a name used
by Sara Lee."'52 Given that Sara Lee received notice of plaintiffs' suit, albeit
after the statute of limitations had run, when an alias and pluries summons was
served upon a Sara Lee official authorized by statute to receive process, 5 3 the
court of appeals rejected L'eggs' argument that plaintiffs had improperly substi-
tuted a new party after the expiration of the statute of limitations and defined
the key issue as "whether a corporation may properly be sued in its assumed
name."
54
North Carolina's assumed business name registration statute, like similar
statutes in forty-seven states,55 primarily serves to make assumed names a mat-
ter of public record in the county or counties where business activities are con-
51. Id. at 7-8, 351 S.E.2d at 838.
52. Id. at 8, 351 S.E.2d at 838; see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
53. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(6).
54. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 7, 351 S.E.2d at 838. The issue was one of first impression in North
Carolina courts.
55. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.35.040 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1236, 44-1460
(1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-111 (1980), § 70-401 (1979); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17910
(West 1987) (very comprehensive); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-71-101 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-1
(1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3101 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.09 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988)
(part of criminal code); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-490 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482-2 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 53-501 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 4.15 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1987),
ch. 96, paras. 4, 8a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1-I (Burns 1984 & Supp.
1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.7 (West 1962 & Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.015
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:281 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13A, § 307 (1981), tit. 31, § 2 (1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2, § 18 (1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 110, § 5 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.1,450.1217 (1980) (MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19.821, 21.200(217) (Callaghan 1983)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.01 (West 1981 & Supp.
1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.210 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-203
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-210 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 602.010 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 349:1 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:1-2 (West 1964 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-
3-3 (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 130 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-68
(1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-25-02 (1978 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.01
(Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1140 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 648.007 (1987); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 303 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-
7.1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-5-35 (Law. Coop. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-11-1
(1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-14-101 (Supp. 1987); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.10,
36.11 (Vernon 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2-5 (1981 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,§§ 1621, 1623 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-69 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.80.010
(Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 47-8-2 (1986); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.04, 134.17 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 40-2-102 (Supp. 1987). These statutes vary widely in their scope. For
example, some state statutes apply to corporations while others do not; some states have separate
corporate assumed name statutes while others prescribe the same rules for corporations, partner-
ships, limited partnerships, and sole proprietorships. While it is possible to make some generaliza-
tions about the statutes, particular state statutes should always be consulted. See also Guilbert,
Corporate Names and Assumed Business Names: "Deceptively Similar" Creates a Likelihood of Con-
fusion, 62 OR. L. REV. 151, 161 (1983) (discussing assumed business names in the context of state
regulations prohibiting registered names from being so similar as to confuse or deceive consumers).
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ducted.5 6 In 1919 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that the purpose of
the registration statute is "to require notice to be given to the business world of
the facts required to be set out in the certificate, to the end that people dealing
with a firm may... know with whom they are trading, and what is the character
of the firm .... ,,"7 North Carolina General Statutes section 66-71 provides civil
penalties for failure to file a certificate of registration, but adds that a failure to
file does not bar the violator from maintaining a civil action in North Carolina
courts or collecting a recovery in such an action.58 No mention is made in the
North Carolina statute of whether a noncomplying business may be sued in its
assumed name.
The 1981 North Carolina Court of Appeals case Rollins v. Junior Miller
Roofing Co. 59 bears on whether a business may be sued in the name under which
it pursues commercial activities rather than in the name of the legal entity con-
trolling the business. In Rollins plaintiffs sued defendant Junior Miller Roofing
Company (the Company) for breach of contract and negligence, alleging that the
Company was a North Carolina corporation. 60 The Company filed an answer
stating that there was no existing legal entity named Junior Miller Roofing Com-
pany and that there was no company incorporated anywhere doing business
under that name.61 At a summary judgment hearing the trial judge granted
plaintiffs' motion to strike the allegation of incorporation, thereby omitting any
reference to the Company's legal status, but nonetheless allowed the Company's
motion for summary judgment.62 Plaintiffs asserted in their appellate brief their
belief that the trial court based its ruling on the improper designation of the
Company's status in the complaint. 63
The court of appeals found no basis for summary judgment in Rollins, hold-
ing that it is not essential for a complaint to specify the defendant's legal sta-
tus.64 When a summons directed to the Junior Miller Roofing Company was
served upon Junior Miller's wife in Miller's office, the Company had fied an
answer and cross-claim under the name Junior Miller Roofing Company, and
56. See supra note 14.
57. Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493, 496, 101 S.E. 33, 34 (1919).
58. See supra note 14. In many states failure to comply with the provisions of the assumed
business name registration statute does preclude the violator from bringing any civil actions until a
registration is filed. See, ag., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17918 (West 1987); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 602.070 (1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 130(9) (McKinney Supp. 1988). North Carolina courts
have held contracts made by firms failing to comply with section 66-68 are not void because of this
failure. See, eg., Security Finance Co. v. Hendry, 189 N.C. 549, 554, 127 S.E. 629, 631 (1925);
accord Parker v. Rod Johnson Farm Service, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 190, _, 384 N.E.2d 1129, 1131
(1979) (defendant cannot point to corporation's use of name other than true corporate name to avoid
contract absent showing of prejudice); Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen, 8 Ariz. App. 424, 428, 446 P.2d
934, 938 (1968) (validity of contract entered into under assumed name depends upon "whether name
is used in good faith by party adopting it").
59. 55 N.C. App. 158, 284 S.E.2d 697 (1981).
60. Id. at 162, 284 S.E.2d at 701.
61. Id.
62. Id. The trial court did not state its grounds for granting defendant Junior Miller Roofing
Company's motion for summary judgment. Id.
63. Id. at 162-63, 284 S.E.2d at 701.
64. Id. at 163, 284 S.E.2d at 701; see N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(a) (party raising issue as to capacity of a
party to be sued must do so by specific negative averment).
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Miller himself had'signed a stipulation "[t]hat all parties were duly served and
properly before the court,"65 the court of appeals determined that jurisdiction
was established over Miller and that Miller received adequate notice of plaintiffs'
suit.66 While the Rollins court did not recommend omission of a defendant's
legal status in a complaint, it quoted favorably from an opinion in a similar Iowa
case:
As long as the real party receives proper notice of the action, we are
unable to see any prejudice in permitting him to be sued in a trade or
fictitious name alone. However, a careful practitioner should continue
to bring suit against the individual as well as the fictitious name in
which he may be doing business.67
There is no apparent reason why the Rollifis rationale could not be extended to
the corporate context in Tyson, since the intended defendant received proper
notice of the action 68 amid plaintiffs' substantial and justifiable confusion over
the proper legal designation of the corporate defendant.
Although the Tyson court neglected to mention Rollins, it did cite a Geor-
gia case that strongly supports allowing plaintiffs to bring suit in defendants'
assumed business names. In Hutcheson Memorial Tri-County Hospital v. Oli-
ver 69 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that "[a] corporation conducting busi-
ness in a trade name may sue or be sued in the trade name."'70 The court added,
"When a complaint is brought against a defendant in a trade name, the com-
plaint is amendable by stating the real name of the person doing business under
that name; and the amendment does not introduce a new party."17 1 This latter
assertion is restated in the Tyson court's holding that when service of process is
accomplished on the intended defendant, a misnomer or misdescription in the
summons or complaint may be amended at any stage of the proceedings. 72
Decisions in other jurisdictions comport with the holdings in Tyson and
Oliver.7 3 In a 1939 case with facts similar to Tyson, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that when the Carolina Baking Company established a business
65. Rollins, 55 N.C. App. at 163-64, 284 S.E.2d at 701-02.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 163, 284 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Thune v. Hokah Cheese Co., 260 Iowa 347, 353, 149
N.W.2d 176, 179 (1967)). The court also quoted with approval the statement, "'[A] person may be
sued under a trade name.'" Id. at 163, 284 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parties § 46
(1971)).
68. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
69. 120 Ga. App. 547, 171 S.E.2d 649 (1969).
70. Id. at 547, 171 S.E.2d at 650. Plaintiff had sued defendant hospital in the trade name John
L. Hutcheson Memorial Tri-County Hospital instead of the official corporate title of the Hospital
Authority of Walker, Dade, and Catoosa Counties, Georgia. The trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss based on a failure by plaintiff to name as defendant a legal entity capable of being
sued. Id. at 547, 171 S.E.2d at 649-50.
71. Id. at 547, 171 S.E.2d at 650.
72. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 8, 351 S.E.2d at 838; see Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group
Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App. 659, 662, 316 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1984); Bailey v. McPherson, 233 N.C. 231,
235, 63 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1951).
73. See, eg., Sheraton Corp. of Am. v. Kingsford Packing Co., 162 Ind. App. 470, _, 319
N.E.2d 852, 857 (1974) (when corporate hotel operator permitted its trade name to be used by
investment company running hotel and did not notify plaintiff of this relationship, it is equitably
estopped to deny business dealings with plaintiff); Miller's Super Mkts. v. Hobart, 482 P.2d 413, 414
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under that name but later transferred all its assets to Columbia Baking Corpora-
tion and dissolved without filing a required notice of dissolution, and when the
original trade name Carolina Baking Company continued to be used on the busi-
ness' motor vehicle license, truck, and plant sign, any judgment rendered against
Carolina Baking Company was payable by Columbia Baking Corporation. 74
The court further stated, "The corporate fiction and the rules surrounding it
have been of inestimable service in the affairs of business, but they must be ap-
plied in such a manner as to promote justice, not to hinder or defeat it."'75 The
court added that while suit should only be brought in a name other than the true
corporate designation under exceptional circumstances, "'[i]f a corporation has
acquired a name by usage an adjudication against it by the name so acquired is
valid and binding"' absent prejudice to the corporation.76 Illinois also allows
plaintiffs to bring suit in a corporate defendant's assumed business name pro-
vided plaintiffs meet certain notice requirements unique to Illinois law.77
The Tyson court was forced to balance two potentially competing concerns.
On one hand, injured plaintiffs deserve reasonable access to our courts with a
minimum of legal obstacles preventing them from seeking redress. On the other
hand, the courts must continue to demand the high standards of precision the
law has come to expect in plaintiffs' designation of intended defendants in their
summons and complaint. The court's opinion reflects the conclusion that it
could tolerate a slightly lesser degree of specificity in the naming of business
defendants if this created a wider courthouse door for plaintiffs whose suits
would have been barred under a strict reading of the rules governing process. In
so holding, the three-judge panel of the court of appeals echoed the opinion of
many of their judicial brethren elsewhere who have allowed plaintiffs to bring
suit against a corporate or business defendant in that defendant's assumed busi-
ness name. Although in Tyson this determination arose in the somewhat unu-
sual setting of a libel suit, the significance of this holding as applied in the more
common area of consumer transactions cannot be ignored.
Unethical businesses seeking to make a quick sale and then retreat behind a
shield of intentionally convoluted business designations and equally complex
legal procedures will be profoundly affected by Tyson. No longer will meritori-
ous consumer lawsuits be sabotaged by business-generated confusion regarding
(Colo. App. 1971) (corporation doing business under assumed name liable to same extent as if busi-
ness was transacted under true corporate name).
74. Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 193 S.C. 225, 237-38, 8 S.E.2d 326, 331 (1939).
75. Id. at 238, 8 S.E.2d at 331.
76. Id. at 239, 8 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting 14 C.J. 325, Corporations § 391 (1919)). The court fully
recognized a corporation's right to enforce and be bound by contracts entered into under an assumed
name. Id. at 239, 8 S.E.2d at 332.
77. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text; see also Cigan v. St. Regis House Hotel, 72
Ill. App. 3d 884, 887-88, 391 N.E.2d 197, 200-01 (1979) (court allows post-judgment amendment as
to defendant St. Regis Hotel where that defendant entered a voluntary general appearance without
making jurisdictional objection and should not have been misled by process directed to St. Regis
House Hotel, but denies post-judgment amendment as to defendant Merryman Hotel Corporation
where that defendant filed a special appearance to contest jurisdiction and plaintiff failed to name all
known owners of hotel and designate as unknown all others pursuant to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 96,
para. 8a (1977)).
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the defendant's true legal identity, for now consumers have the option of filing
suit in the business' assumed name if the proper designation is undiscoverable.
Early in the statute's history courts cited the prominent role consumer protec-
tionism plays in the requirement of registering assumed business names pursuant
to North Carolina General Statutes section 66-68.78 After Tyson consumers are
also protected from non-registered businesses that seek to achieve their dishon-
est ends by failing to make their assumed business names a matter of public
record. Although plaintiffs' confusion in Tyson came not from a willful decision
by Sara Lee not to register, but from a failure to keep the registration current or
accurate, 79 expansion of the Tyson holding to cases of knowing violation of the
registration statute is inevitable. As the Appellate Court of Illinois has stated on
one occasion, "a cause of action arising out of the conduct or transaction of
business [should not be] defeated because of the claimant's inability to identify
the individuals who in fact own and conduct the business."80
However, potential plaintiffs should not infer this loosening of process re-
quirements in the exceptional context of assumed business names to mean that
courts are now willing to overlook significant Rule 4 violations to give consum-
ers their day in court. As the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated many
times, "'where a statute provides for service of summons or notices in the pro-
gress of a cause by certain persons or by designated methods, the specified re-
quirements must be complied with or there is no valid service.' "81 Tyson is
clearly an exception to this general rule, not a new rule in and of itself. To
prevent plaintiff abuse of these liberalized process rules and strike an appropriate
balance between the competing interests of plaintiffs and business-defendants,
North Carolina's General Assembly should amend the assumed business name
registration statutes by adopting the unique and well-crafted statutes currently
in force in Illinois.82
Like North Carolina General Statutes section 66-68, Illinois' registration
statute creates a public record of assumed business names that allows consumer-
plaintiffs to find out the true identity of their intended defendant.8 3 Plaintiffs are
only excused from naming defendants by their correct legal designation when a
business has failed to register its assumed name. In cases where no registration
has been filed and some, if not all, of the business' principals are unknown, Illi-
nois' statute allows a plaintiff to bring suit against the business in its assumed
78. See Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C. 493, 496, 101 S.E. 33, 35 (1919) (statute is a "'police
regulation to protect the general public .. . from fraud and imposition'" (quoting Courtney v.
Parker, 173 N.C. 479, 480, 92 S.E. 324, 324 (1917) (denying recovery to building materials supplier
on balance due for materials furnished defendant where supplier failed to register plaintiff's name as
owner of business pursuant to assumed business name statute))).
79. See Sheraton Corp. of Am. v. Kingsford Packing Co., 162 Ind. App. 470, 319 N.E.2d 852,
857 (1974); Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 193 S.C. 225, 238, 8 S.E.2d 326, 331 (1939).
80. Curtis v. Albion-Brown's Post 590 Am. Legion, 74 Ill. App. 2d 144, 149-150, 219 N.E.2d
386, 389 (1966).
81. Guthrie v. Ray, 293 N.C. 67, 69, 235 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1977) (quoting S. Lowman & Co. v.
Ballard, 168 N.C. 16, 18, 84 S.E. 21, 22 (1915)).
82. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96, paras. 4-8a (Smith-Hurd 1971 & Supp. 1987).
83. See id. ch. 96, para. 4.
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name. 84
In order to bring suit, however, the plaintiff must comply with certain stat-
utory requirements. The plaintiff must, for example, name all known owners of
the business in the complaint and designate all others transacting business as
"unknown owner or owners."85 Any judgment in plaintiff's favor acts as a
"personal judgment against all named owners" and an "immediately enforceable
judgment" against the business' personal property and a lien against real estate
held by the business.86 Also, if plaintiff learns the identity of a previously un-
known owner before the judgment is satisfied, plaintiff may make a motion to
name the formerly unknown owner as a party defendant. Unless the owner then
can assert defenses, any judgment previously entered in the suit becomes a per-
sonal judgment against this new defendant.8 7
The Appellate Court of Illinois has stated that, in passing section 8a of
Chapter 96, the General Assembly of Illinois intended to provide "a remedy
which could effect satisfaction of any judgment obtained, at least to the extent of
the assets held in the assumed name of the business, and [to] further [impose]
liability on the known owners." 88 The Illinois statute seems ideally suited to the
problems posed by suits brought against defendants in their assumed business
names. It both limits such suits to situations in which plaintiffs have no other
means of discovering a defendant's true legal identity, and provides plaintiffs in
such uncommon circumstances with a wide range of effective remedies. North
Carolina would be well-advised to adopt a similar statute that strives to equalize
society's interest in affording injured plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity for legal
recourse with the -concomitant interest in maintaining an efficient judicial
system.
Although the result reached by the court of appeals in Tyson was the cor-
rect one under North Carolina law, the fact remains that L'eggs Products, Inc.
received no notice of plaintiffs' suit until Aigust 14, 1985, over two months after
the statute of limitations for a libel cause of action had expired.89 That plaintiffs
were able to maintain their cause of action by using an alias and pluries sum-
mons seems to contradict the avowed purpose of a statute of limitations, the
establishment of a date beyond which defendants need not worry about stale
claims being asserted against them.90 This peculiar result can be attributed to
the use of the alias and pluries summons, a method of extending the time for
service of process that is permitted under North Carolina Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 4(d)(2), but is absent from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
84. See id. ch. 96, para. 8a.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Curtis v. Albion-Brown's Post 590 Am. Legion, 74 Ill. App. 2d 144, 150, 219 N.E.2d 386,
389 (1966).
89. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
90. "Statutes of limitations are inflexible and unyielding. They operate inexorably without ref-
erence to the merits of plaintiff's cause of action. They are statutes of repose, intended to require
that litigation be initiated within the prescribed time or not at all." Shearin v. Lloyd' 246 N.C. 363,
370, 98 S.E.2d 508, 514 (1957).
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Indeed, had Tyson been heard in a federal court rather than in a North
Carolina state court, a different result almost assuredly would have been
reached. In Schiavone v. Fortune,91 the United States Supreme Court relied on
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in holding that an amend-
ment substituting "Time, Inc." for its publication "Fortune" as the defendant
named in plaintiffs' complaints would not relate back to the date the original
complaint was filed because Time, Inc. had not received notice of the suit prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations. 92 Rule 15(c) provides that "[ain
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
... within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him,
the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense
on the merits."'93 The Schiavone court rejected plaintiffs' argument that "the
period provided by law for commencing the action" included the 120-day period
allowed under the federal rules for service of the summons and complaint. 94
Schiavone can thus be read to say that unless a defendant receives notice of plain-
tiff's action within the applicable limitations period, not including the time per-
mitted for service of process and regardless of whether the defendant has
actually been served with process, plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action.
Relation back was not an issue in Tyson because North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) provides for the use of an alias and pluries summons and
because North Carolina's Rule 15 does not contain the section discussed in
Schiavone concerning amendments changing parties. 95 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's result in Schiavone suggests that to prevent the statute of limi-
tations from becoming an illusory concept in North Carolina, either Federal
Rule 15 should be adopted in whole or Rule 4(d)(2) should be amended to per-
mit use of an alias and pluries summons after the statute of limitations for a
cause of action has run only if the defendant has received notice of the cause of
action. 96 In this way, notice will always be provided to the defendant within the
91. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
92. Id. at 30. In Schiavone plaintiffs filed their complaints on May 9, 1983, alleging that they
had been libeled in Fortune magazine. The complaints named "Fortune" as defendant and de-
scribed Fortune as having offices in the Time and Life Building in New York City. On May 20 the
complaints were mailed to the registered agent for Time, Inc. in New Jersey. The agent refused
service on May 23 "because Time was not named as a defendant." New Jersey's statute of limita-
tions for a libel cause of action was one year from the date of publication. Id. at 22-23. The lower
court found that publication occurred in mid-May 1982. Id. at 25. On July 18, 1983, plaintiffs
amended their complaints to "name as the captioned defendant 'Fortune, also known as Time, In-
corporated.' The amended complaints were served on Time... on July 21." Id. at 23. The Court
held that neither Fortune nor Time received notice of the suit before May 23, and that May 19 was
the latest date at which the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 30. Therefore, relation back did
not occur because notice to Time did not take place "within the period provided by law for com-
mencing the action" against Time. Id.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
94. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 30-31; see FED. R. Civ. P. 4G).
95. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
96. In at least one respect Schiavone is a stronger case for allowing plaintiffs to maintain their
cause of action than Tyson. In Schiavone the agent who received the original complaint identifying
Fortune as the defendant acknowledged in a letter to Time's legal department that the suits were
directed against Time. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Tyson the original
agent receiving service of process was associated with an entirely different corporation, and no one
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appropriate statute of limitations period, whether or not process is received in a
timely manner. This amendment to the current North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure would best assure that the interests of both injured plaintiffs and al-
legedly responsible defendants are respected and neither is unfairly
disadvantaged.
CHRISTOPHER P. EDWARDS
associated with "L'eggs Products, Inc." was officially notified of the pending suit until August 14,
1985. Tyson, 84 N.C. App. at 4, 351 S.E.2d at 836.
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